3b-4a: For Whom do we Poskin?

There is a fascinating discussion on this amud which continues on to 4a about authority of law. It comes in regard to plowing on the eve of the shemittah year. We first have a statement from Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, which he attributes to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi and Bar Kappara, that Rabban Gamliel and his court ruled that fields may be plowed up until Rosh HaShana of the shemittah year. This surprises later amoraim, who claim that this is a direct repudiation of a takana of Beit Shammai and Bei Hillel which said that Pesah and Shavuot are teh deadline for plowing fields of grain and trees respectively. How can a later beit din, and one with less kavod and people, change the takana of an earlier beit din? -- the gemarra asks. The Talmud tries to get around it by saying Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel added a stipulation to their original takana that it could be changed if necessary.

Ok, but the plot thickens. The Talmud then asserts that this ruling of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is actually halakha l'Moshe MiSinai! Top that! Rabbi Yohanan tries, but is rejected by the Gemarra, by arguing that Rabban Gamliel's court did a gezeira shava on "Shabbat" referring to creation and then shemittah in the Torah. This overrides oral law (halakha l'Moshe miSinai) with biblical law (a gezeira shava on a verse proves a law has biblical origin). Rav Ashi, however, rejects this and smooths everything over by arguing that it is a difference of having a Temple or not having a Temple. The Torah prohibitions and the takana by Beit Shammi and Beit Hillel apply when the Temple is standing, but, as Rabban Gamliel's court taught, it does not apply when there is no Temple standing.

What is so striking to me about this argument is the evolution of the arguments. It seems that, as time goes on, a greater divide emerges between the ideal and the real. Whether you take the first position as halakha l'Moshe MiSinai or from Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel - it is dealing with a reality - the laws of shemittah are in force. Rabban Gamliel, ruling about 150 years after the destruction of the Temple and shemittah laws, makes a change that seems to reflect the new reality. The later amoraim in the gemarra are appaled that Rabban Gamliel would overturn this original ruling - disregarding reality for a more idealized law. It only when Rav Ashi comes, the latest of amoraim, that the argument is resolved with a compromise. Saying that one law applies while the Temple stands and another applies when it doesn't is a stalling tactic that satisfies both camps. It holds the argument in abeyance until the Temple comes again, when the halakha can be argued again. But it doesn't acknowledge the new reality - or the authority of existing courts to modify received law like the court of Rabban Gamliel did.

When we decide halakha - who do we decide it for? The people who are living in the present? Or the ones who live in the past or the future - which in their minds is often the same thing?